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Beyond the modern: Muslim youth imaginaries of nation in Northern Nigeria  
Abstract 
The rise of different nationalisms in an increasingly unequal and neoliberal world make 
predictions about the dawn of a post-national, global society seem both incongruous and 
fraught with Eurocentric occlusions. In response, we present a postcolonial analysis of 
research into Muslim youth narratives of nation in Northern Nigeria. This highlights the 
continued significance of nation for youth as well as the historical fractures - both internal 
and external - that infused their identity narratives. We further show the entanglement of 
nation and religion in youth imaginaries, and their anti-colonial ambivalences, notably with 
respect to gender reforms. Our analysis calls for a sociology of nation that goes beyond a 
modern framing and instead attends to the agonistic affective relations through which 
national imaginaries are constructed; the historical sutures that were intrinsic to the 
creation of postcolonial nations and their enduring persistence as points of fracture.  
 
Introduction  
Only recently late modern sociologists suggested that the nation-state was no longer useful 
as a category of analysis through which to understand the complexities of living in a 
globalised world. Youth identities in particular were framed by global flows that 
transcended the nation as a natural ‘container’ and implied instead an unavoidable 
cosmopolitanization (Beck, 2002). In contrast, we see an intensification of appeals to 
national values, increasingly vigorous policing of national borders, and record numbers of 
displaced peoples, as the ‘others’ of the nation. While cosmopolitanization is one way of 
interrogating the global flows of our late modern world, others take up postcolonial 
analyses which point to the historical interdependences between the Global North and 
South (Bhambra, 2016; Go, 2013). Drawing upon postcolonial writers (Bhabha, 2004; Said, 
1978), they illuminate the Eurocentric biases of classical sociology and call instead for 
‘connected sociologies’ (Bhambra, 2014) that better recognise the deep inequalities that 
have informed relations between the ‘West’ and the ‘rest’ (Hall, 1992).  
 
In this paper we similarly adopt a postcolonial lens to challenge Eurocentric understandings 
of nation and its modern associations.i We draw on postcolonial scholars (Bhabha, 2004; 
Chatterjee, 1993; Spivak, 1998) to explore the elisions of a conceptualisation of the nation 
as an imagined community (Anderson, 2006). We then take up recent empirical research 
into Muslim youth narratives of nation in Northern Nigeria as a critical case of the 
construction of the nation, in ways that trouble Eurocentric assumptions. Our analysis 
demonstrates how youths’ identifications with their nation remain significant, but also how 
these go beyond modern (secular) understandings that assume a separation of the state and 
religion. Through our analysis of youth narratives, we show that a secular understanding of 
time as linear and homogeneous (Anderson, 2006) fails to recognise the historical fractures 
in youths’ imaginaries and the axes of differentiation through which postcolonial nations 
claim their distinctiveness (Bhabha, 2004; Chatterjee, 1993; 2003).  
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Context 
Nigeria is a critical postcolonial context through which understandings of the nation can be 
problematized. In this section we provide a brief overview of Nigeria’s contemporary socio-
economic situation and its history as a nation state, including how contemporary regional, 
ethnic and religious divisions were shaped by its colonial past.  
 
Located in West Africa, the Federal Republic of Nigeria was created in 1963 after gaining 
independence from British colonial rule in 1960. It is the most populous country in Africa, 
with an estimated 193 million inhabitants (UNDP, 2018). Its population is also very young, 
with a median age of only 18 years and 62% under the age of 25. Although its economy is 
now larger than that of South Africa, the majority of Nigerians (70%) are estimated to live 
below the poverty line (CIA, 2019). Regional variations are also significant. Figure 1 shows 
that against a national human development indicator (HDI) of 0.521, HDI figures for 
Nigeria’s northern states are significantly lower than for southern states (UNDP, 2018). 
These inequalities are compounded when gender is brought into play. Nigeria ranks 133 out 
of 149 countries for gender parity (World Economic Forum, 2018).  
 
Please insert Figure 1 here (Human Development Index for Nigerian States (UNDP, 2018)) 
 
 
Nigeria’s constitution as a nation-state reflects a history of territorial, religious and ethnic 
differences and conflict (Authors, 2017; Nnoli, 2008). Its territory was a product of British 
colonialism, which was consolidated in 1914 through the amalgamation of Lagos Colony, the 
Southern Nigerian Protectorate and the Northern Nigerian Protectorate. Despite their 
considerable differences, these three regions, North, South-East and South-West, later 
became the territorial basis of Nigeria’s federal government upon independence. Although 
Nigeria is now divided into the Federal Capital Territory and 36 administrative areas, the 
tripartite regional structure remains important in popular memory and reflects enduring 
religious and ethnic differences. These are to a large extent legitimated by Nigeria’s federal 
constitution and the different legal codes in place in the North and South. While the 
Nigerian constitution guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion, some 
northern states have a dual legal system that recognises Shari’a law, although not in the 
states where the research was conducted.  
 
Nigeria is a multi-ethnic state, with around 500 languages and 300 ethnic groups. Of these, 
the Hausa from the North make up 27 percent of the population; the Yoruba (14 percent) 
originate in the South West; the Igbo from the South East represent a further 14 percent, 
leaving the remainder (45%) distributed across a plethora of other ethnic groups (CIA, 
2019). Turning to religion, just over 50% of Nigeria’s population is Muslim, predominantly 
living in the Northern states; 45% are Christian, residing mostly in the South, with 9% also 
practising traditional religions (CIA, 2019). This pattern reflects the spread of Islam from 
North Africa since the 12th century, and the later arrival of Christianity from the south during 
European colonial eras. At the same time, these regions are not religiously homogenous - 
many Christians live in the North, and vice versa. Nigeria’s regions are also ethnically 
heterogeneous.  
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Alongside resistance to colonial rule, Nigeria’s history as a nation-state has been fraught 
with conflict, including attempted secession by the South Eastern region in the Biafran War, 
coups, attempted coups, military regimes, ongoing inter-ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta, 
Plateau, Kaduna and Kano State (Daily Trust, 2019), rising kidnapping and banditry, and the 
Boko Haram insurgency.  The latter has caused many Muslim and Christian deaths, as well 
as large numbers of displaced people. It also led to a state of emergency being declared in 
2013 in some Northern States, including in Adamawa, one of our research sites. 
Significantly, the current religious and ethnic fractures in Nigeria have been traced back to 
the strategic favouring of particular groups and regions by the colonial administration and 
its systems of indirect rule (Onapajo and Usman, 2015; UNDP, 2018). Nigerian politics 
remain sensitive to regional, religious and ethnic divisions. Strong regional differences are 
evident for example in voting patterns in recent presidential elections (BBC, 2019). These 
saw the re-election of Mohammadu Buhari, leader of the All Progressives Congress party 
(which is largely associated with the north), despite contestation of the election results 
(Egbejule, 2019). Overall, this national context is fraught with deep inequalities, and 
divisions of an ethnic and religious nature that were instantiated during the colonial eras 
and sedimented in the formation of Nigeria as a nation-state.  
Theoretical Framing 
Having outlined elements of Nigeria’s contextual history, we now take up postcolonial 
discussions of the concept of nation. While the turn of the century saw suggestions that the 
concept was of diminishing sociological relevance (Beck, 2002), events in the last decade 
have shown this to be misplaced. On the contrary, rather than the emergence of a global, 
post-national society, we are witnessing an intensification of appeals to national values, 
more stringent policing of national boundaries, and ever-increasing numbers of displaced 
people - the ‘others’ of the nation. However, a further critique of late modern theories is 
their neglect of postcolonial and Global South perspectives. This paper draws on 
postcolonial and poststructural writers to highlight sociology’s historical Eurocentric biases, 
its neglect of the interdependencies of modernity with coloniality, and its misrecognition of 
the complexities of nation in contexts of postcoloniality (Bhambra, 2007, 2016; Chatterjee, 
1993, 2003; Go, 2013).  
 
A starting point for our article is therefore a critical engagement with the orientalism of 
classical sociology, which constructed non-Western societies as backward and static, in 
contrast to the dynamism and creativity of European societies (Go, 2013; Said, 1978). It has 
assumed a modern teleology of progress and development. This has failed to recognise the 
colonial histories upon which Western development depended, as well as the epistemic 
injustices implicated in the construction of Western superiority (de Sousa Santos, 2007; 
Ngugi, 1986; Spivak, 1988). As Go (2013) argues, classical sociology occluded the ways that 
modernity was constituted through colonialism, while also privileging Western ontologies 
and epistemologies that constructed colonised peoples in deficit ways. Importantly, these 
modern ontologies often cast religion in a negative light, as something that an enlightened 
citizenry would increasingly eshew or relegate to the private sphere (Asad, 2003; Krämer, 
2013).  
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Postcolonial analyses also inform our engagement with the concept of nation. An influential 
discussion of ‘nation’ has been Anderson’s (2006) portrayal of it as an ‘imagined political 
community’. However, although Anderson’s opening chapters pointed to nationalism’s 
emergence as a response to imperialism and colonial domination in the Americas, these 
anti-colonial roots have been glossed over in later analyses. Instead, its emergence is often 
related to the rise of the modern nation-state, as a largely European phenomenon. As 
Anderson (2006: xiii) notes, although his intention was to highlight the ‘New World’ origins 
of nationalism, European scholars have often assumed the later ‘second generation’ 
European nationalisms as a starting point in their analysis. This has allowed the imaginary of 
the nation to be understood as a primarily European invention.  
 
A particular issue here for postcolonial writers is the negative construction of ‘ethnic’ versus 
‘civic’ nationalisms, and more generally how terms such as ‘tribal’, ‘indigenous’ and ‘native’ 
produce such groups as the ‘uncivilised others’ of western modernity (Bhambra, 2007; 
Chatterjee, 2003; Go, 2013). Following Said (1978), postcolonial scholarship has shown how 
colonisation and orientalism contributed to the production and reification of ethnic 
boundaries within colonial contexts (Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988). For Mamdani (1996), a 
consequence was that African politics has remained fractured by ethnic particularisms. 
 
However, others suggest that expressions such as ‘ethno-nationalism’ continue to reflect 
orientalist perspectives by denigrating those nationalisms which did not become ‘official 
nationalisms’ (Larmer and Lecocq, 2018; Tinsley, 2019). Like Fanon (1967), Larmer and 
Lecocq (2018) point out that ‘official nationalisms’ in African contexts were often propelled 
by local elites working within colonial administrations, rather than by popular consensus. 
This left national imaginaries multiply contested, to the extent that the national ‘integration’ 
which such ‘official nationalisms’ proclaimed could be experienced as ‘internal colonisation’ 
by non-dominant ethnic groups (2018: 910). As such, they argue for a historicised 
exploration of national imaginaries that attends to regional, ethnic, and religious affiliations, 
rather than dismissing these in orientalist ways.  
 
A related issue is the significance Anderson attaches to modern (secular) understandings of 
time for making the imagined community of the nation possible. Chatterjee (2003) 
questions Anderson’s understanding of time as linear, homogeneous and empty, as well as 
his utopian construction of this. Chatterjee argues instead that time in postcolonial contexts 
is ‘heterogeneous, unevenly dense’, more consonant with a ‘heterotopia’ (166). Bhabha 
(2004) similarly disputes Anderson’s emphasis on the uniformity of serial, homogeneous 
time, highlighting instead the ‘double temporality’ that is involved in the construction of a 
national culture and the interpellation of national subjects:  
 
The scraps, patches and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of 
a coherent national culture, while the very act of the narrative performance 
interpellates a growing circle of national subjects. In the production of the nation as 
narration, there is a split between the continuist, accumulative temporality of the 
pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative. (Bhabha, 
2004: 221) 
 
5 
 
This has important implications. Firstly, rather than having ‘sociological solidity’, the ‘nation’ 
and its historical narration should be considered as an ongoing fabrication, in which multiple 
temporalities are implicated. Secondly, in contrast to Anderson, Bhabha highlights the 
ambivalences and tensions that are intrinsic to any modern, national imaginary which 
attempts to bring a heterogeneous community together through the ‘disjunctive narrative’ 
of the nation. Rather than being consensual, we need instead to be alert to the agonistic 
nature of this fabrication (Mouffe, 2005).  
 
A further important issue from postcolonial perspectives is the continuing, constitutive 
difficulty for new nations emerging from colonial rule in relation to a wider imaginary of ‘the 
West’. Following Said (1978), the ‘West’ is not a stable or geographical ‘fact’, but rather ‘an 
idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery and vocabulary [..] shaped by a 
relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony’ (5). These 
relations inform Chatterjee’s (1993) questioning of what is left for the postcolonial nation to 
imagine, if the nation has to be imagined in forms already proposed by Europe. Stressing the 
importance of difference in the constitution of any identity, he suggests that although new 
postcolonial nations followed the West’s modes of statecraft, particularly in terms of 
economic and political governance, they asserted their difference through cultural and 
spiritual domains. These became a ‘fundamental feature of anticolonial nationalisms in Asia 
and Africa’ (1993: 6).  
 
Importantly, the emphasis on the spiritual sits in considerable tension with Western 
imaginaries of the nation as secular. The ‘stripping away of myth, magic and the sacred’ was 
constitutive of what Asad (2003: 13) describes as the ‘secular space’ of modernity, as well as 
the ‘myth’ that secularism was intrinsic to the development of liberal democracies. Such 
assumptions have allowed Islam and Islamic societies to be constructed as ‘pre-modern’, or 
even ‘anti-modern’, despite the ways that Islamic leaders have been implicated in 
democratic ‘modernising’ movements (Krämer, 2013). The analysis that follows contributes 
to such debates by showing the fusions of nation and religion in youths’ national imaginaries 
(Chatterjee, 1993). We argue for a sociology of nation that goes beyond a modern secular 
framing.  
 
Bhabha’s emphasis on narration and interpellation is also critical to the analysis we present 
below of youths’ identity constructions. We resist modern understandings of identity as 
reflecting a unitary, rational, autonomous self. Instead, we think of identity performances as 
discursively produced (Foucault, 1984), involving ongoing processes of becoming that are 
contingent, saturated with power relations, and never complete (Hall, 1996). This is framed 
by poststructural understandings of signification that recognise all meaning-making to be 
constituted through difference, in ways that are agonistic and indeterminable (Mouffe, 
2005). Taking up these perspectives, we see the production and performance of identities 
(including national identities) as always being constituted through relations of difference, or 
relations to the ‘Other’: 
 
it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely 
what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the 'positive' 
meaning of any term - and thus its identity - can be constructed. (Hall, 1996: 4-5) 
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As we recount below, our research methodology aimed to create spaces for youth to 
narrate how they identified with their nation, and to articulate to us the ‘scraps, patches 
and rags’ through which this was constructed for them (Bhabha, 2004), in reference to their 
‘constitutive others’ (Hall, 1996). This is based in a Foucauldian understanding of narrative 
as a product of ‘the structures and forces of discourse, power and history’ (Tamboukou, 
2009: 102). 
  
Methodology 
The research drawn upon in this article was part of larger study of youth narratives of 
identity with respect to nation, religion and gender in four different postcolonial contexts 
(Authors, 2017). This article focuses on the research in Nigeria, as this context illuminates 
particularly well the contested nature of nation within a multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
postcolonial context. The research took place within two northern states in Nigeria, Plateau 
in North Central and Adamawa in North East, and involved a team of nine local research 
assistants from these contexts. Alongside observational data, the main data set comprised 
focus groups discussions (FGDs) with Muslim and Christian youth in 2014. Nine FGDs were 
held with females and eight with males; nine were with Muslims and eight with Christians. 
In total 78 youth participated, of whom 58 percent were Muslims and 56 percent were 
female. Participants’ average age was 24 years, and their age range 18-36. Table 1 provides 
a summary of the FGD sample. Youth were self-selected volunteers; their participation in 
the research followed an invitation through local intermediaries who were education 
professionals working in local higher education institutions. As also clarified below, we make 
no claim that the participants constitute a representative sample. The research underwent 
ethical review at the UK university of the lead researcher and in its local contexts. Ethical 
processes included use of an information sheet to gain participants’ consent. For reasons 
explained below, the analysis focuses on the FGDs with Muslim participants. 
 
Please insert Table 1 here  
 
After unsuccessful trials with mixed sex groupings, the FGDs were segregated by gender and 
by religion, with the aim of allowing more open discussion of potentially sensitive issues. At 
the start of each FGD, participants were asked to complete a bio-data sheet, providing their 
age, religion, ethnic group and main languages. All the Muslim participants were from 
Northern Nigeria and were in higher education. They came from 9 ethnic groups. One third 
were Fulani (the Hausa term for the Fulbe). A further quarter were Hausa. Multiple tribal 
affiliations were also identified (Bachama, Kilba, Higgi, Bura, Gude Gombe in Adamawa; 
Berom, Amo, Goemai, Jukun, Ngas, Talet, Tarok in Plateau State). 
 
The FGD schedule and research protocol were developed through an initial research pilot in 
Nigeria in 2011 and then subsequently refined (see appendices in Authors, 2017). This 
included translation into relevant local languages with the support of the local research 
assistants, who were themselves youth. They also translated the transcripts into English. At 
the beginning of each FGD, participants were invited to say how they would introduce 
themselves to someone who was not from their national context, which generated 
responses such as ‘I am a Muslim Nigerian from Adamawa’. Participants were then asked a 
range of questions about their nationality, religion, ethnicity and gender, and their 
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intersections. For example, participants were asked what their nationality meant to them, 
what they saw as important national characteristics, who were their national 
heroes/heroines, and what made them proud (or not) to be a national of their country. The 
schedule included similar questions in relation to religion, asking for instance what the 
characteristics of an ideal Muslim or Christian were, what religious figures were important 
to them, how life would be different if they were Christian rather than Muslim (and vice 
versa). All of these questions were probed for gender differences, for example what male 
and female ideals were for their nation, and their religion. The questions also intersected 
nation, religion and ethnicity, through questions such as how Nigerian Muslims were 
different from Muslims in other national contexts, or how being Muslim was different for 
someone of a different ethnic group. It elicited the ‘others’ of national and ethnic 
identifications (Hall, 1996) by asking participants what other nationalities and ethnicities 
they would not want to have, as well as those they would like to have. Finally, questions 
probed generational differences. 
The FGDs mostly had 5-6 participants and lasted between 40 to 90 minutes. The FGD 
schedule was followed in flexible way to facilitate an open discussion and create space for 
youths’ identity narratives. Many FGDs were highly animated and illustrated well the 
affective and agonistic nature of participants’ identifications with their nation. We were 
aware of pressures towards conformity however, as discussed further in Authors (in press). 
Although individual excerpts are mainly used to support the analyses below, this is for 
conciseness. Our unit of analysis is not the individual, but the discourses available in these 
contexts for youth to construct and narrate their identities. 
Data analysis began by discussing the FGDs with the local research assistants, how they felt 
the discussions had developed, what key issues had emerged, and translation queries. The 
transcripts were re-read repeatedly, and issues clarified through revisiting the audio and/or 
discussing the transcript with the interviewer. The transcripts were coded by hand against 
the key concepts (nation, religion, gender and ethnicity). Finally, codes of ‘internal other’ 
and ‘external other’ were developed to reflect whether the ‘constitutive others’ against 
which youth identity narratives were constructed were internal or external to the nation. 
Each FGD was allocated a code that denoted religion, gender, location and an ordinal FGD 
number (1-17). So a code of MMA16 refers to FGD 16, with Muslim, male youth in Adamawa 
State, while MFP13 refers to FGD 13, with Muslim, female youth in Plateau State.  
 
The lead UK-based researcher conducted the pilot FGDs in Nigeria and inducted the team of 
nine local research assistants into the conceptual framework for the research, the research 
instruments and research ethics. The research team included Muslim and Christian males 
and females, which allowed matching of participants’ religion and gender with those of the 
interviewers in most FGDs. The local research assistants encouraged participants to use 
their preferred language which led to code switching between Hausa, English, Pidgin and 
other vernacular languages. FGDs were recorded, transcribed and translated into English.  
 
The main focus of this analysis is the FGDs conducted with educated Muslim youth in 2014. 
At that point a state of emergency had been declared in Adamawa after the escalation of 
the Boko Haram insurgency. This prevented the UK-based researcher from travelling to 
Northern Nigeria. It was also felt that FGDs with out-of-education youth could put the local 
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research assistants at risk. As access through teacher training and higher education 
institutions remained possible, this became the key route through which participants were 
identified. Given the low percentages of youth in higher education in this context, they can 
be considered a relatively elite group. However, given the complex history of Nigeria’s 
national formation and the contemporary conflicts afflicting this region, the narratives of 
nation of educated Muslim youth in this postcolonial context are of high relevance for this 
special issue. We have therefore made these FGDs the focus of this analysis.  
Youth Narratives of Nation in Northern Nigeria 
Our research set out to explore the ways in which youth in this postcolonial context 
identified with the concept of ‘nation’. Given its colonial fabrication, it is notable that the 
great majority of participants were strongly positive about ‘being Nigerian’. An analysis of 
participants’ responses to an opening question about how they would introduce themselves 
to someone from outside their national context showed that they referred most frequently 
to nation, religion and region. This produced responses such as ‘I am a Nigerian, a Muslim 
from Adamawa State’. More powerfully, however, discussion of what being Nigerian meant 
to these youth and what made them proud to be Nigerian provoked strong affective 
responses that suggested its significance for their identities: 
 
P4: I really thank God for making me a Nigerian because it is something of great 
priority for me to be a Nigerian because as compared to other countries in Africa or in 
the world at large, Nigeria is actually a peaceful country. (MMA16) 
P2: we have many refugees here in Nigeria [..] that means Nigeria is peaceful place 
where any can come live and you see by just looking that I am proud to be a Nigerian. 
(MFA24) 
P3: There is one big thing that makes me proud being a Nigerian. That thing is unity. 
… Nigeria is blessed with different multi-ethnic groups … despite our diversity, we are 
able to unify ourselves and achieve a kind of development. (MMA16) 
Many participants emphasised how Nigerians lived peacefully together, specifically resisting 
Nigeria’s associations with ethnic conflict, religious fundamentalism and/or terrorism. In 
other words, the process of asserting Nigeria’s national unity invoked its ethnic and religious 
pluralism, even as this is brought together as one imagined community. Through these 
articulations, youth are signalling the ‘constitutive others’ of their national identities (Hall, 
1996). However, as we discuss further below, such claims to nation are ongoing agonistic 
productions which are multiply contested (Mouffe, 2005).  
A further distinguishing characteristic of youths’ national imaginaries is the way these were 
sutured together with their religious affiliations. While appeals to religion are already visible 
within the previous excerpts, many other assertions of youths’ sense of nation specifically 
brought nation together with religion:  
P7: To me I am proud to a Nigerian because Nigerians are very religious people, in 
terms of their faith, either Muslims or Christians, they are very religious. (MMA16) 
P5: 70 percent of Nigerians they have their religion in their heart (MFA12) 
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These excerpts show how Christianity and Islam are embraced with pride within this fusion 
of nation and religion, and how its religious pluralism is asserted as a distinguishing feature 
of being ‘Nigerian’. Just as ‘nation’ has not withered away in contemporary societies (Beck, 
2002), this is clearly also the case for religion. Indeed in a postcolonial context, religion was 
often critical to national self-definition. As Chatterjee (1993) argued, the cultural and the 
spiritual were ‘defining features’ of the national imaginaries in postcolonial nations in Africa 
and Asia.  
 
This suturing of nation and religious identities in this context also challenges a Western, 
secular thesis of the nation, which assumes religion will be progressively eschewed.  As 
noted earlier, such assumptions have led to Islam being constructed in popular western 
media as pre-modern, or even anti-modern (Asad, 2003).  In contrast, it is significant that 
youths’ imaginaries of nation in this context were both religious and modern. This can be 
seen in responses to what made youth not proud to be a Nigerian. These showed both male 
and female youth to be highly critical of the workings of the Nigerian state and desirous of 
change:  
P1: … they don’t bring out money to help people, like bad roads, schools are not 
equipped, hospitals too they are not well equipped, there are some operations we 
Nigerians we have to go outside to have that operation, why can’t we have it in our 
own country? They are eating money. (MFP13) 
So while youth embraced their nation, they also called out for change.  As Authors (2017) 
illustrate, there was much debate across male and female FGDs about poor amenities, 
political corruption and incompetence.  Many assertions of pride in being Nigerian also 
invoked comparisons of Nigeria with other African nations. These were often framed 
through a global hierarchy of developed and developing countries, and a binary opposition 
of the ‘West’ versus ‘the rest’ (Hall, 1992) that is significant in this postcolonial context. 
These youth narratives do not suggest the emergence of a post-national society (Beck, 
2002) but demonstrate awareness of a global geo-political arena and Nigeria’s positioning 
within that. Importantly however, the embrace of development and change in their 
narratives (echoing the national motto of Unity and Faith, Peace and Progress) also suggests 
that their national imaginaries were modernising, at the same time as being infused by 
religion.  
Fracturing the nation: intersections of religion and region 
The section above showed how the signifier of the Nigerian nation worked to unify its 
imagined community across its many differences. We now explore the fractures of youths’ 
national imaginaries, noting as we do so their complex temporalities (Bhabha, 2004) and 
how divisions instantiated during colonial eras remained at the forefront of youth 
narratives.  
 
We focus here on the intersections of nation with region, religion and ethnicity. Before 
turning to our analysis, we recall the complex ethnic composition of Nigeria, with over 500 
languages and 300 ethnic groups, and how its major ethnic groups (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo) 
are identified with the North, South West and South East respectively. As explained earlier, 
religious differences between the predominantly Christian South and the predominantly 
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Muslim North also intersect to some extent with ethnic affiliations. Nevertheless, each 
region is ethnically and religiously diverse.  
 
Importantly however, region (North versus South) proved to be a dominant signifier of 
internal difference in youths’ narratives of nation, particularly within the male FGDs. As we 
show below, this was again entangled with religion, along with ethnic differences. A further 
recurring dimension of youth narratives was their reference to the histories of these 
tensions. As Bhabha (2004) has argued, the construction of the nation is not done in linear, 
homogeneous time, but involves multiple temporalities where an imagined past constantly 
infuses the present.  
 
This is evident in the excerpt below from an extended conversation exploring internal 
differences. This illustrates a deep affective differentiation between the North and South: 
 
P2: … our forefathers have inculcated in us an element of hatred between the North 
and the South and there is no respect if you see an Igbo man here, he will be first 
identified as an Igbo not as Nigerian. (MMA16) 
The reference to ‘our forefathers’ signals the historical roots of the differentiation, whose 
affective intensity - involving elements of hatred – is also made clear. The North/South 
division is then mapped onto a differentiation against the major ethnic group from the 
South East, the Igbos. This is constructed as a dominant signifier of identity that puts in 
question his Igbo identification as a Nigerian.  
If this excerpt illuminates the history of such tensions, the following quotation shows how 
such divisions continued to reverberate within contemporary contexts. Here we again see 
the invocation of a North/South divide, mapped onto ethnic categorisations: 
P4: … if something like violence comes up in Nigeria, so, the Igbos are the first target. 
The Northerners will attack on Igbo’s property in the North, and likewise in the South, 
if something happens there… for instance just recently, there was a bomb blast in 
Kano. So, the Igbos… because the people that were killed are Igbos, so, the Igbos that 
are in the Southern part of Nigeria retaliate towards the Northerners that are living 
there. (MMA15) 
In consonance with these sensibilities, when our Northern Muslim participants were asked if 
there were particular ethnicities they would not want to have, the Igbos were consistently 
named.  
In another instance, a history of regional differences between North and South was taken 
up as the starting point for internal fractures in the nation, but then associated with 
religious differences. So in the excerpt below, in response to questions about how the North 
sees the South, being Northern was associated with being Muslim, in a pejorative way, in 
association with the Boko Haram insurgency:  
P3: Actually there are a lot of problems between the North and South. It is in the 
history that since the Biafran War the Southerners have it in mind that they are non-
Nigerians up till now. They regard themselves as citizens of a Biafran country because 
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at this particular point in time, especially during this democratic period, the 
Northerners do not want the Southerners to rule them while the Southerners do not 
want Northerners to rule them. This is because of the regional differences between 
us. So my own observation, we are living like the ‘yam and palm oil’ [a Hausa saying 
used to describe a distrustful relationship], we are living together but our minds are 
not clear. More especially during this insurgency, if you go to the South they think 
you are Boko Haram. They will call you Boko Haram straight forward. (MMA16) 
Here we see regional differentiation being mapped onto religious (Christian/Muslim) 
differences, even if Nigeria’s regions are religiously diverse. Interestingly, the regional 
division between North and South also produced an internal hierarchy between Muslims, in 
which Yoruba Muslims or Muslims in the South were felt not to be ‘proper’ Muslims 
compared to Muslims in the North: 
P5: A Muslim from Yoruba land is different from (one in) Kano or another (northern) 
state …  
P4: … they value culture more than religion, it’s just ignorance of religion before it 
was like that (in the north) now it is changing. (MFA13) 
P3: If Abdul (a Muslim) is from a southern part of Nigeria, if he comes to the North … 
some Muslims do not accept them as good brothers and sisters. …. some Northerners 
will think that your religion is not as perfect as his (northern) religion. (MMA15) 
Again, alongside these deep divisions, youth narratives often pointed to the histories of 
these differences. In the example below this was related to colonial practices of ‘divide and 
rule’:  
 P1: … there is a concept of divide-and-rule that our leaders introduced to us, your 
blood brother who happens to be a Christian will hate you because of what is 
introduced to him by politicians, so that is what makes me feel bad. The kind of 
leadership being practiced in Nigeria is what is making me very sad about being a 
Nigerian. (MMA2) 
Importantly, these comments are not only a critique of what this youth sees as the injustices 
of the colonial era but are also directed towards the politicisation of religion by 
contemporary Nigerian leaders.  
Overall, our analysis of these data shows region to be the most significant internal fracture 
in Nigeria as an imagined nation. The use of ‘hatred’ to depict regional relations shows the 
profound affective charge in these fractures. The sedimentation of the North/South 
differentiation was however often associated with differences between the three major 
ethnic groups (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba), in ways that flattened recognition of the multi-
ethnic diversities within Nigeria’s main geographic regions, and indeed the diverse ways that 
ethnicity, religion and region map onto each other. As Larmer and Lecocq (2018) note, the 
use of an ethnic signifier (e.g. Igbo) constructs their affiliations as ‘ethno-nationalisms’ in 
ways that tend to disqualify them from being ‘proper’ Nigerians. Given that these relations 
have been forged over centuries, including those of the colonial era, this suggests the 
importance of an historical analysis of the divisions that reverberate within postcolonial 
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nationalisms (Go, 2013; Larner and Lecoq, 2018). This leads us to the final section in our 
analysis, which takes up the construction of the postcolonial nation against the ‘other’ of 
the ‘West’ (Hall, 1996; 1992).  
A postcolonial ‘modern’ nation: ambivalences and contradictions 
We start this section by revisiting the concept of the ‘West’, including our critique of binary 
constructions such as the ‘Occident’ and the ‘Orient’. As Said (1978) commented, the ‘West’ 
is not a stable or geographical ‘fact’, but ‘an idea that has a history and a tradition of 
thought, imagery and vocabulary’ (p.5). Although we agree with Hanafi (2019) when he calls 
for a sociology that transcends binaries of East versus West, or indeed tradition versus 
modernity, this section is prompted by the recurring invocation of notions such as ‘the 
West’, ‘western civilisation’, or ‘white people’ by our participants. Their identifications 
against such concepts were shifting and ambivalent however, rather than suggesting an 
Occidentalist ‘hatred’ of the West (Buruma and Margalit, 2004). Their more antagonistic 
constructions nevertheless had important implications for gender equality reforms, as we 
show below.  
 
We introduce this part of our analysis by linking the invocation of discourses of ‘the West’ to 
the regional divisions between North and South that we depicted in the previous section. In 
the excerpt below, region was again intersected with differences in religion and ethnicity in 
ways that constructed the superiority of the national imaginary of the North:  
P1: Currently our Nigerian Muslims are imitating the white people. So, as of now you 
can’t differentiate them, more especially, Yoruba people [Southerners]. (Laughs) 
(MMA17) 
In this excerpt, imitating ‘the white people’ is represented as being inauthentic, a kind of 
contamination of local, ‘indigenous’ Nigerian culture. At the same time, as the following 
excerpts show, the notion of ‘the West’ was not always constructed as an antagonistic 
other: 
P4: We must not forget that the world we are in today is a western world, we are 
civilized […]. For instance I am a Nigerian, I wear English clothes… (MFA24) 
P1: But the youths there do not believe with these [ethnic] traditions nowadays. So 
you can see that our parents believe in traditions while we believe in western 
civilization and the rest. (MMA16) 
Here the ‘western world’ and ‘western civilization’ are embraced, although this was not 
without contradictions (see further quote from P1/MMA16 below). More frequently, the 
epithet of ‘western’ was used to symbolize rejection of practices that were represented as 
an alien imposition from other cultures (Krämer 2013), associated with colonial or neo-
colonial domination.  
 
It was particularly in relation to gender equality legislation that tensions between ‘western’ 
and ‘local’ traditions were evident in youth narratives. Several postcolonial writers have 
highlighted how colonialism reconstructed local gender relations and imposed western 
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‘liberal’ gender ideals (Coly, 2015; Chatterjee, 1993; Lugones, 2007; Spivak, 1988). Indeed, 
with respect to Yoruba culture, colonialism is accused of introducing the concept of woman 
to its society and imposing a binary ‘bio-logic’ of male and female that was deeply 
patriarchal (Oyěwùmí, 1997).  
 
 With others, such writers have highlighted how national imaginaries are deeply gendered, 
and how this leads to the policing of women, with respect to their bodies, their dress, and 
their moralities. This typically involves a gender regime of compulsory heterosexuality, 
wherein women are held responsible for the moral codes of the nation and for its 
reproduction, in ways that are naturalised as a biological fact, or as Butler (1990) puts it, ‘a 
naturalised facticity’. The additional importance of the spiritual and the cultural as defining 
features of postcolonial nationalism implies an intensification of the regulation of women as 
symbolic guardians of their national cultures (Chatterjee, 1993).  
 
The regulation of women seemed extremely powerful in this context, as discussed in 
Authors (in press). This was reflected in the relative assertiveness of the male FGDs and 
their more outspoken commentary on public issues. Responses to a question about male 
and female ideals of nation often illuminated a public/private divide that saw women 
confined to the private, domestic sphere of the home:  
 
P4: Women in Nigeria, most of them are housewives. Most of them are restricted to 
domestic roles. More especially here in the North (MMA17) 
Female FGDs echoed this gendered division but also attributed the domestic positioning of 
women to Islamic traditions:  
P4: … the Muslim men are to go outside and look for what to take care of the family, 
while the women you’re going outside without your husband permission is totally 
unacceptable (MFA14) 
Here we recall our earlier arguments about the complex fusions of different gender regimes 
in contexts of coloniality and postcoloniality (Chatterjee, 1983; Oyěwùmí, 1997). Female 
FGDs sometimes contested gender relations. For example, when asked how Nigerian men 
were different from Nigerian women, they critiqued how men could marry four times, and 
women only once (see Authors, in press). However, their narratives also testified to the 
strength of these gender norms. This meant that national legislation promoting gender 
equality now sat at odds with the gender relations that male and some female participants 
saw as legitimate, as illuminated by the following responses:   
P1: … I cannot allow my wife to go out in public without a reasonable excuse that is 
allowed by my religion. …  I cannot allow her to work in a public institution; my 
religion denied me that, so I cannot expose her to such level. … the law is saying that 
women should go out and participate in politics, this is against my religion. (MMA16) 
P1: … in Islam it is not accepted for a woman to become a leader … they (men) are 
more economical, they control our economy. We women we do as women we are just 
there to guide them and help them, they have the powers - they rule us. (MFA13) 
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Female participation in the public sphere was constructed as incompatible with proper 
Islamic practice and indeed as an import from ‘other nations’ (MMA17). In other words, 
association with the West is constructed as alien to local culture and actively resisted. As 
Chatterjee (1993) has highlighted, the postcolonial (anti-colonial) nation asserts its 
distinctiveness against the West by preserving its unique cultural and spiritual domains, in 
ways that are intensely gendered. Women’s bodies become a critical symbol for the anti-
colonial nation and as such are subject to intense moral scrutiny and policing (Coly, 2015; 
Authors, in press).  
Conclusion 
In this analysis, we have drawn on predominantly postcolonial theorists to illuminate three 
key issues. Firstly, these Muslim youth strongly embraced the imagined community of their 
nation, in ways that were affectively charged and agonistic. Secondly, this nation was a 
profoundly religious nation. Importantly, when imagining their nation, many youth wanted 
change and improvement in their social situations. This could be characterised as a 
reforming and religious imaginary. This disrupts the thesis of the secular nation and 
confirms the importance of moving beyond pejorative constructions of religious belongings 
as being non-modern, and indeed beyond modern assumptions that a separation of political 
and religious beliefs is possible (Asad, 2003; Hanafi, 2019). As Butler (2011) has argued, 
religion works as a ‘matrix of subject formation, an embedded framework for evaluations, 
and a mode of belonging and embodied social practice’ (72). She challenges the supposed 
absence of religion from contemporary public life by highlighting how the very concept of 
the public sphere can be considered a ‘protestant accomplishment’. This means that ‘public 
life presupposes and reaffirms one dominant religious tradition as the secular’ (2011:71), at 
the same time as demanding that other religions are relegated to the private sphere.  
 
Thirdly, our analysis presents a related critique of Anderson’s (2006) premise that a 
historical condition of possibility for the imaginary of the nation was the advent in the 
modern age of secular time - this being empty, homogenous, linear time, measured by the 
clock and the calendar, on which the development of capitalism depended. Following 
Bhabha (2004) and Chatterjee (2003), we have shown how the imagined past of the nation 
(and the history of its formation) infuses contemporary constructions of nation for these 
youth. Their national imaginaries remained scarred by the continuing traces of the colonial 
past and the regional, ethnic and religious divisions this had consolidated. As Coly (2015: 18) 
has argued, ‘the temporality of colonial modernity haunts postcolonial time’. Even if youths’ 
national imaginaries had modernising elements, these were positioned in conflicted ways 
against an imaginary of ‘the West’ that could also be expressed in racialized terms (i.e. with 
reference to ‘white men’). While cautious about binary constructions, including with respect 
to East-West flows (Buruma and Margalit, 2004), youth themselves defined their nation in 
such oppositional terms, and used notions of cultural authenticity to disqualify state-level 
gender equality legislation as an illegitimate western import (Authors, 2017).  
  
In concluding, we argue that a sociology of ‘nation’ needs to take account of the socio-
historical contexts through which nations have been forged, especially for postcolonial 
nations. This includes an awareness of historical Eurocentric biases, and how these have 
produced understandings of the nation through the lens of secularization and secular time. 
We agree with those who call for ‘connected sociologies’ that attend both to the historical 
15 
 
inequalities that have informed relations between the Global North and South, and the 
internal fractures of the postcolonial nation (Bhambra, 2007; Fanon, 1967), particularly 
when, as Spivak and Harasym (1990: 166) remind us, ‘[w]e live in a post-colonial neo-
colonized world’. We further argue for the relevance of a poststructural analysis that can 
attend to the affective, agonistic construction of national imaginaries and their historical 
injustices. 
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Figure 1: Human Development Index for Nigerian States (UNDP, 2018) 
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Table 1: Focus Group Discussions by Religion, Gender and Location 
 
 FGDs Individuals Gender Location 
   Female Male Adamawa Plateau 
Muslim 9 45 27 18 45 0 
Christian 8 33 17 16 20 13 
Total 17 78 44 34 65 13 
 
 
 
i Our use of the term ‘modern’ invokes the ‘Age of Modernity’, which has been described a ‘qualitatively new 
way of thinking concerned with the application of reason, experience and experiment to the natural and the 
social world’. In addition to the pursuit of human progress, the intersecting ideals of European modernity 
included opposition to traditional religious authority and the separation of religion and the state (Hamilton, 
1992:18-22, see also Bhambra, 2007). 
 
 
 
